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Abstract
This paper uses Poisson and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
techniques on panel data from the United Nations World Health Organization’s
FluNet to evaluate factors contributing to a country’s H1N1 influenza (swine flu)
pandemic outcomes. Countries with higher development (as measured by gross
domestic product and the United Nations Human Development Program’s
development index) and higher mean annual temperature (as measured in the
capital city) tended to have an earlier first reporting of cases. Though subject to
reporting biases, the results also suggest that mass vaccinations have a negative
effect on weekly reported cases. Countries that would vaccinate in the future
(after the vaccine was developed) had on average six times the weekly case
reports of countries that wouldn’t vaccinate. Other policies tested (thermal
scanners at entry points, flight bans, and pork bans) showed no consistent
negative result.
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Preface
In the fall of 2010, I spent the semester studying in London. Over the
summer, I had heard about “swine flu” and had even seen a few reports of it
locally. Once I arrived in London, I was surrounded by National Health Service
advertisements to “Catch It, Bin It, Kill It.” One of my flatmates was diagnosed
with H1N1, and all of us came down with some form of it. Our school handed out
hand sanitizer; our landlord came through with sanitizing wipes, twice-weekly
cleanings, and extra tissues. Yet when I returned to the U.S. in the spring, I heard
little of the virus. Syracuse University offered the vaccine once it was available,
and had installed hand sanitizer dispensers across campus, but outside of our
campus bubble, there was little apparent campaigning against the virus. I was
intrigued by these regional differences, and was eager to learn more about the
variation in pandemic approaches.
Dr. Christopher Rohlfs of the Economics Department helped me develop
my interest in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic into a researchable question—how did
countries attempt to prevent, contain, and treat H1N1, and what factors influenced
their pandemic experience?
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Advice
For an Honors student, completing a Capstone seems the logical step
senior year. But in reality, it should start so much earlier than that. Theoretically, I
started working on my Capstone when I took econometrics my sophomore year,
because the use of STATA has been invaluable to the many iterations of my
project. Learning how to use the “tools of the trade” should definitely begin
before your Capstone—I wish I had also learned GIS, but by senior year, it was
too late. A few bits of advice, so you don’t repeat my mistakes:
•

Choose a topic you love. This will be at least six credits’ worth of your
time senior year—you want to enjoy it.

•

Find the experts in your topic, and talk to them early on. If your thesis is
multidisciplinary, it’s helpful to have to talk it over with people from
multiple departments, as they can bring different perspectives to the table.

•

Do your best to make the inevitable catastrophic problem happen during
your first semester…or else you’ll end up working on your Capstone
during spring break.

•

When the inevitable catastrophic problem happens, don’t lose hope.
You’ve put several months’ worth of work into this, and there’s still a
project there. You just need to find it.

•

Reward yourself! It’s a lot of work, but definitely worth the effort.
Milestones give you a sense of accomplishment, and finishing is the best
of all.
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I. Introduction
Dr. John Snow is often lauded as one of the founding fathers of
epidemiology. Dr. Snow traced cholera through London’s water supply, and was
able to pinpoint the pump spreading the disease. Since his time, government
officials and scientists have tried to protect society from disease, focusing on
identifying threats, containing them, calculating a response, and preventing future
outbreaks. The H1N1 pandemic is now in the final stage of this process, with the
vaccine being incorporated into the seasonal flu vaccine.
However, little research has been conducted on the different pandemic
experiences of infected nations, and the effectiveness of the policies implemented
during the pandemic. While some analysis of pandemic preparedness plans has
been performed (“HHS…,” “National…”) few studies have evaluated the
treatment effects of pandemic interventions. In 2009, during the height of the
pandemic, the World Bank announced that global pandemics like the H1N1
pandemic can shave off up to 1% of an affected nation’s GDP, making pandemic
preparedness of paramount importance (“The cost…”). Oxford Economics
estimated in 2009 that the pandemic would cause the world GDP to be cut by
approximately 2.5 trillion dollars (“Impact of…”).
Yet H1N1 fell short of predictions. As illustrated in Table 1, the pandemic
caused approximately 14,300 recorded deaths around the world, compared to one
million in the H3N2 pandemic in 1968-9, and two million in the H2N2 pandemic
in 1956-8. H1N1 did surpass the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) pandemic, which caused 916 deaths. However, the pandemic still caused
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economic woes from decreased productivity in the workplace, air travel effects,
and impacts on agricultural trade.
Dame Deirdre Hine believes that though the pandemic prevention
techniques employed were based upon more dire estimates, the preparation is
worthwhile for its applicability in other pandemic situations (Hine). Hine
estimates that the United Kingdom spent 1.2 billion pounds (about two billion
dollars) on pandemic preparedness and response, including vaccines, antiviral
drugs, communications, and stockpiling for future pandemics. Slightly less than
half of this amount was spent on responding to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
specifically. ABC News estimates a much lower cost of response in Australia,
approximately 200 million dollars (“$200…). The United States Congress
appropriated nearly eight billion dollars to combat the pandemic, including the
cost of preparedness planning for government and school officials (Amico).
There is a wide range of policies available to a government hoping to
contain a pandemic, ranging from the cancellation of social events to the
imposition of martial law. This paper will focus on four such policies: restricting
the import of pork from nations reporting H1N1, restricting flights to and from
infected nations, using infrared scanning to determine elevated body temperatures
of those entering a nation, and vaccinating the population of a nation.
Of the 88 nations included in this study (selected for the presence of H1N1
and consistent availability of baseline data), 11 imposed restrictions on the import
of pork, 19 restricted air travel, 34 used infrared scanning, and to date, 55 nations
have implemented mass-vaccination campaigns.
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This paper uses both Poisson and multiple regression modeling to estimate
the impact of each policy, in combination with the other three policies and with
baseline controls for demographics, time trends, and a country’s previously
demonstrated susceptibility to influenza. A time series analysis, looking at the
pattern of new cases before and after each policy is enacted, and a binary analysis,
looking at new cases once the policy is in effect, are both included in the model.
Initial findings suggest that vaccination has a reductive effect on weekly
H1N1 cases in both OLS and Poisson models. Vaccination timing varied among
nations, with the most developed countries vaccination in early November of
2009, and less developed countries vaccinating by January of 2010. Thermal
scanning, pork bans, and flight bans were implemented by the spring of 2009, but
these policies have no reductive effects in the preferred specification of the OLS
and Poisson models. Countries in warmer climates, with more tourism, and with
higher populations tended to have more weekly cases of H1N1. Countries with
higher levels of development and tourism also tended to have an earlier start to
the pandemic. Comparing the pandemic and post-pandemic periods (using the
August 10th date announced by WHO), most subgroups experienced a 60%
decline in weekly cases. However, North America and South America
experienced much steeper declines in weekly cases, while European countries
maintained caseloads only slightly decreased from pandemic levels.
This paper is divided into five sections. Following this introduction is a
description of the key factors and data, and then the estimation strategies in
Section III. Section IV details the results of each model, and Section V concludes.
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II. Key Factors
Subtype A H1N1 influenza, or “swine flu,” is a form of viral respiratory
illness traditionally found in pigs and pig farmers. In general, the strain endemic
to pigs cannot be transmitted by human-to-human contact. However, in April of
2009, a strain of H1N1 influenza capable of human-to-human transmission
emerged in Mexico. Infections with the same viral sequence were then found in
San Diego, California and Guadalupe County, Texas, and the pandemic spread to
the rest of the United States and Canada (CDC briefing) (Panel A of Figure 1).
The virus spread next to the United Kingdom and parts of Asia, and by
late May it had reached South America, most of Europe, Australia, and one
country in Africa. By September 2009, countries in North and South America
were seeing significant death tolls (more than 100), and Western Africa was
among the few remaining regions without reported cases (Panel B of Figure 1).
That month, the H1N1 vaccine finished development and October of 2009 saw
mass vaccinations in many countries.
By the end of January 2010, death tolls in Europe and Asia had also
climbed, and almost all countries in Africa had reported cases of H1N1 (Panel C
of Figure 1). On August 10, 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared an end to the official H1N1 pandemic, stating that they expected to see
H1N1 circulate like a seasonal influenza strain. WHO also cited “herd immunity”
from widespread infection and vaccination as reason for the decline in virus
activity (WHO August PR). Indeed, little change in total deaths and new
infections is seen between Panels C and D of Figure 1.
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When news of the virus in Mexico and the United States first emerged,
some nations chose to ban imports of pork and pork products from these or all
nations. However, there is no scientific connection between consumption of pork
and infection with H1N1. The virus is believed to be transmitted in the same way
as other influenza viruses—by direct contact with respiratory droplets from
coughing or sneezing (BBC Q&A). Countries enacting this policy did so within
the first month of the virus’s emergence.
Some nations chose to ban air travel to and from countries reporting H1N1
infections. Research by the Children’s Hospital Boston suggests that air travel
restrictions may be effective in delaying the regular influenza season (“A public
health…”). Countries choosing this policy also enacted it within the first month of
the virus’s emergence.
Some nations installed thermal imaging cameras at major travel
checkpoints (airports, seaports, etc). Thermal imaging cameras use infrared
technology to monitor the body temperature of groups of people entering a
checkpoint. Those with temperatures above the regional norm are pulled aside for
additional monitoring, as an elevated body temperature suggests fever, a symptom
of influenza. Countries using thermal imaging implemented the system by the
second month of the pandemic.
Once the vaccine was developed, some nations implemented mass
vaccination campaigns to provide the vaccine to their citizens. While some
nations vaccinated “priority” groups first, such as health care workers, the dates
used in this paper are those for the general vaccination open to the entire public.
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However, this paper discusses the provision of vaccines only—as detailed
vaccination rates were not available, this paper tests the effects of making
vaccines available, rather than their use. The vaccine was not developed until
September of 2009, and some nations did not conduct vaccination campaigns until
February of 2010.
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III. Data Description
Two main dependent variables are used in this paper—weekly H1N1 case
totals as reported to the United Nations through the World Health Organization’s
FluNet program, and the start week of the pandemic for each country, designated
by the first week in which H1N1 cases were reported through FluNet.
Country-specific characteristics are also included in the dataset,
accounting for demographic, geographic, and epidemiological factors.
Demographic data include each country’s population, gross domestic product,
annual international visitors, and development ranking by the United Nations
Development Program. Dummy variables for each country’s continent are also
included to account for regional interaction. To adjust for baseline cultural
differences influencing general disease susceptibility (social kissing, personal
distance, etc), total annual seasonal influenza cases are also included. As these
data are reported to the United Nations FluNet, they are presumably subject to the
same reporting biases as the H1N1 pandemic data.
Four policies are also included in the data set—the use of thermal scanners
at entry points, the ban of flights to and from infected nations, the ban on pork
imports, and the disbursement of the vaccine developed in the fall of 2010. Using
news articles and government releases, I determined which of the four policies
had been implemented, and on what date they began to affect the general public.
There are 88 countries in the final data set, with weekly case reports for
110 weeks, from 2009 to 2011. Missing data reports brings the total number of
country-week observations to 8,144.
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Table 2 gives sample means for selected data variables. The weighted
column details the means of data observations, which is equivalent to weighting
country means by their number of observations. The un-weighted column gives
country means. The difference in these means suggests bias on the proportion of
observations recorded.
The mean weekly total of new H1N1 cases for country-weeks in the
dataset is 129, with a standard deviation of 553. The mean population (weighted
by number of observations) of countries in the dataset is 93 million, and the mean
gross domestic product (again weighted) is 70.6.
Thirteen percent of the observations in the dataset are from Africa, 22%
are from Asia, 36% are from Europe, 15% are from North America, and 11% are
from South America. The remaining 4% are located in Oceania. Roughly 33% of
the observations are from countries considered “very highly developed,” 28% are
considered “highly developed,” and 36% are considered to be of “medium
development.”
The data set has an overrepresentation of more economically developed,
more populous countries, as the weighted means for these categories exceed the
unweighted. Unfortunately, data are not consistently available for less populous
and less developed countries. Furthermore, 27% of countries in the dataset are in
Asia, but only 22% of observations. There is an overrepresentation of countries
in Europe and North America, suggesting that there was more consistent data
reporting in these regions. These biases limit the conclusions that can be drawn
from this analysis.
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In general, the warmer countries in the sample tended to have fewer
weekly cases than cooler countries, consistent within subgroups of similar tourism
and also within subgroups by pandemic policy selection (Tables 3 and 4).
Countries choosing to ban flights to Mexico or to ban pork had a similar level of
average weekly cases, between 144 and 149 new cases of H1N1 per week.
Countries vaccinating or using thermal scanners had a somewhat lower average
weekly caseload, between 124 and 129 new cases of H1N1 per week. More
tourism also correlates with a higher average weekly caseload, both overall and
within temperature subgroups.
As seen in Table 5, increases in population or tourism have a
corresponding increase in average weekly new cases, as does the combination of
the two factors (with the exception of the most populous, lowest tourism countries
which have a lower weekly caseload than median population, lowest tourism
countries). However, the interaction of temperature and population is less exact—
for a given population level, countries with median temperatures have the highest
weekly caseload, followed by the coldest and then the warmest. For a given
temperature level, countries with median populations generally had the lowest
weekly caseload, followed by those with the smallest populations, and then by the
most populous countries (Table 6).
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IV. Estimation Strategy
The level of observation in this paper is each country i in each week t
combining to form the unit country-week. The country data set includes 88
countries from six continents, with a variety of social, cultural, and economic
backgrounds. The sample was selected for consistent tracking of data, range of
treatments, and a documented presence of H1N1. The data set tracks new
Pandemic H1N1 Influenza cases in these countries over a period of approximately
two years, from the spring of 2009 to the winter of 2011. Cases are those reported
to the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) and may represent an
underestimate of total cases. However, I assume that this underreporting is
relatively consistent across nations and weeks, and any country-correlated
variations in reporting are adjusted for by the inclusion of seasonal influenza
(Influenza A and B) data (also reported to WHO).
This paper assumes that new H1N1 influenza cases in each country-week
are a function of observable baseline characteristics, known policy measures, and
unobservable characteristics, first represented in a linear model as:
Casesit= α + β1Xit + β2Treatmentit + β3LagCasesit +vit
The baseline characteristics included are country-specific, and address a range of
social, cultural, and economic factors that would likely influence the progress of
an influenza pandemic within its borders. These characteristics include the World
Development Index ranking, population, seasonal influenza cases (A & B),
geographic location, and overall climate.
15

Because of the event-probability nature of the data, this paper also
includes two Poisson models—one structured specifically for panel data, and one
structured as a regular Poisson model with robust standard errors. The Poisson
models use the same set of variables as the OLS model with the exception of
country fixed effects, as the model failed to converge with country fixed effects
included. Therefore the preferred specification suggests that the count of cases in
a given country i in a given week t is a function of a vector of baseline
characteristics for each country i, a vector of the time trend for each week t (week
fixed effects) and a vector of policy interventions with an associated country and
week of implementation. While the dispersion of the data may not perfectly fit
the Poisson model of equivalent conditional means and standard deviations, the
use of counts as an outcome variable makes the Poisson probability model
appropriate.
The treatments tested in this model are all preventative and containment
treatments, not palliative or curative. When H1N1 was first detected in Mexico,
19 countries in the sample chose to restrict flights to and from Mexico (some also
restricted travel to and from the U.S.). Thirty-four nations in the sample installed
thermal scanning machines in their airports, monitoring human body temperature
with infrared technology. Fifty-five nations in the sample disbursed the H1N1
vaccine developed in September of 2009, though some nations started vaccination
campaigns later in the pandemic. Lastly, eleven nations chose to ban the import of
all pigs and pork from nations where H1N1 had been confirmed. Each treatment
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in each country has an associated implementation date, and lags for each
treatment are included to capture any delay in the policy’s effect.

17

V. Results
I. Origins of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
As seen in Figure 2, there is no clear pattern between development
(measured by the United Nations Human Development Program rating) and the
start date of the pandemic by continent.
One might assume that the development of a country is actually a proxy
for international inflows like tourism, but a comparison with continent and
tourism interactions shows a relationship between high tourism and earlier start
dates, suggesting something endogenous to development or tourism is the true
cause (Figure 3). As Figure 4 shows, countries with higher development ratings
and higher tourism tended to have an earlier start date, consistent for countries of
high and median tourism. For countries with low tourism, however, there seems
to be no relationship between levels of development and start date. This supports
the theory that tourism was the main method of transmission between countries
(as a start date of the pandemic suggests a new transmission), but for countries
with low tourism, a bundle of endogenous effects, such as geographic location,
was the main determinant.
Mexico, located in North America, was the point of origin for the
pandemic, and it next moved to the United States (Global Health Atlas). Among
countries with high and very high development, countries in North America were
the first to report cases of swine flu, followed by Asia and South America. The
less developed (medium rating) countries of North America reported cases only
after the virus had moved to Asia and South America. Countries of medium
development in Africa report the virus around the same time as less developed
18

countries in Asia, while countries in Europe were the last to get swine flu.
Visualizations of the distribution of start dates are given in Figure 5 (noncumulative) and Figure 6 (cumulative).
Temperature hypothetically could have two types of effect on the flu
experience. First, warmer countries likely have more tourism, thus serving as a
proxy for an increased number of incoming travelers, bringing H1N1 influenza to
the country earlier. In addition, colder climates may force people to spend more
time indoors, reducing person-to-person transmission. The interactions of
temperature and tourism by continent are detailed in Table 7. While warmer
countries in Asia experienced less tourism overall, countries in North Africa,
Europe, North America, and South America demonstrated a positive relationship
between temperature and tourism, supporting the proxy hypothesis.
Looking at the interactions between temperature and tourism, there is no
consistent effect across temperature and tourism groupings. However, for a given
temperature (excluding those of median temperature), having more tourism
correlates with an earlier start date to the pandemic (Table 9).

II. The Pandemic Experience
One would assume that the number of cases in a given week was
determined by a combination of factors endogenous to the country and the time,
as well as exogenous factors like the previous number of cases. Because influenza
is transmitted person-to-person, some existing number of cases is necessary to

19

cause more cases, with the exception of travel’s contribution to international
disease. Table 1 details the model of each of these factors.
Specifically, the model includes dummy variables for each continent
(Oceania excluded), dummy variables for each category of the United Nations
Human Development Program Human Development Index (low development
omitted, medium development excluded because of collinearity), a one week
lagged indicator of new H1N1 cases, time variables for each year-month
combination and individual calendar months, and demographic variables for
population, gross domestic product, annual tourism counts (2008), and annual
reported seasonal influenza cases (types A and B, 2008).
Although the coefficient on the lag of new cases is small, this regressor
explains 45% of the variation in “now” weekly cases. Adding in the controls
increases the explanatory power of the model to 60%. The positive (and
significant) coefficient on the lag of new cases suggests that existing cases will
cause new weekly cases, continuing the pandemic in the absence of exogenous
influence.

III. Policy Interventions
As soon as the epidemic was announced, countries began to prepare for its
arrival—or to attempt to prevent it. Four policies are analyzed in this paper—
thermal scanning at airports to detect and quarantine those with elevated body
temperatures, restrictions on flights coming from countries with H1N1 influenza,
banning the import of pork, and providing vaccines to the general public.
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Policy selection varied across levels of development, as seen in Figure 7.
More than three quarters of the most developed nations chose to have mass
vaccination campaigns, while less than 10% of them chose to enact bans on pork
imports. Conversely, while about half of the countries of medium development
held vaccination campaigns, 20% banned pork, 25% banned flights, and half of
them used thermal imaging cameras at points of entry.
Figure 8 shows how policy selection varied across regions. All countries
in Oceania used vaccines and thermal imaging. In Europe, about three quarters of
countries held vaccination campaigns, while few supported flight bans, pork bans,
or thermal imaging. Countries in Africa were the least likely to vaccinate, with
about 30% of countries choosing to do so, while more than 40% installed thermal
imaging cameras at points of entry. The only countries to ban the import of pork
were located in Europe and Asia, primarily in the Middle East.
Pork import bans and flight bans were the first policies to take effect, as
countries implementing these policies instituted them by the fourth week of the
epidemic. Thermal scanners were already in place in several countries in Asia
because of the SARS and H5N1 pandemics, and other countries adopted them by
the eighth week of the epidemic. However, the vaccine was not developed until
the fall of 2009, about 28 weeks after the beginning of the epidemic. Some
countries did not make the vaccine available for mass distribution until several
months later. The average country rated as “Very High” development started its
vaccination program at the beginning of November, while the average country
with “High” development started its vaccination program at the very end of 2009.
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Countries with “Medium” development didn’t begin vaccination until the
beginning of January in 2010, two months later than those with “Very High”
development (see Table 11 for details).
Table 12 gives the results of the ordinary least squares regression with
increasing levels of controls. In column 7, the preferred specification estimates
that countries in which vaccination has begun experience approximately 26 fewer
H1N1 cases per week than peer nations, significant at the .01 level. All other
policies yield positive coefficients, suggesting that these policies actually increase
the incidence of swine flu. Whether these coefficients are representative of
underlying correlation, or of overconfidence in the policy eroding base prevention
techniques (like handwashing) remains to be proved. However, none of these
coefficients are significant at the .05 or .01 level. The set of controls and policies
in column 7 explain 88% of the variation in weekly swine flu cases.
Tables 13 and 14 detail the results of a similarly structured Poisson
regression. Table 13 is a standard Poisson regression with robust standard errors,
and table 14 is panel Poisson model (using country and week as panel
dimensions). As in the OLS model, we see a statistically significant reductive
effect from vaccination, while the other three policies yield positive (significant
and insignificant) coefficients.

IV. Comparison of Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Experience
In August of 2010, The United Nations World Health Organization
(WHO) declared that the H1N1 pandemic had moved to the post-pandemic

22

period. WHO characterized the post-pandemic period as one in which the H1N1
strain would exhibit seasonal influenza patterns, contrasted with the high infection
rates among the young and healthy during traditionally low influenza times of
year seen during the pandemic period.
Looking at cases before (April 2009 to August 2010) and after (August
2010 to March 2011) this formal conclusion, we see that most subgroups (by
climate, demographic, and geographic controls) experienced roughly a 60%
decline in weekly new cases of H1N1 (Table 15). However, countries in Europe
experienced a much more shallow decline in weekly cases, dropping 16% (from
65 cases/week to 55 cases/week). Countries in North and South America, by
contrast, experienced a more dramatic decline, with countries in North America
dropping 88% (from 322 cases/week to 40 cases/week) and countries in South
America dropping 98% (from 109 cases/week to 2 cases/week). We also observe
a smaller decline in cases among countries with lower populations, dropping 39%
(from 24 cases/week to 14 cases/week), but the regional differences are the most
profound.
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VI. Conclusion
While vaccination appears to be an effective intervention in reducing
H1N1 cases, more research is needed to fully disentangle these effects from
country-based differences (as noted by the varying implementation dates among
countries of different development levels). Future research should also examine
policy effects on morbidity—does vaccination only affect weekly infections, or
also the severity of those infections? If a measure of a country’s “pandemic end”
can be developed, it would be useful to compare the lengths of pandemic
experienced by different countries and compare that with the policies introduced.
It may be that containment policies such thermal scanning and flight bans don’t
affect weekly caseloads, but do impact the initial date of the pandemic and the
length of the pandemic.
This paper also highlights the need for more consistent accounting of
international disease. While many countries did consistently report H1N1 cases
to the World Health Organization (WHO), biases in the level of reporting and
frequency of reporting limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the WHO’s
data. In the case of future pandemics, this study should be repeated with more
consistent and representative data to fully determine the effects of baseline
characteristics and policy interventions on pandemic outcomes.
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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Deaths by Respiratory Pandemic
Pandemic (Year)
SARS (2003)
H1N1 (2009-11)
H3N2 (1968-9)
H2N2 (1956-8)

Deaths
916
14,286
1,000,000
2,000,000

Fig. 1: H1N1 Influenza Cases and Deaths

Table 2: Sample Means of Selected Variables
Weekly New Cases
Population
GDP
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
South America
Oceania
Very High Development
High Development
Medium Development

Weighted
129
93,000,000
71
0.13
0.22
0.36
0.15
0.11
0.04
0.33
0.28
0.36

Unweighted
-61,600,000
68.48
0.14
0.27
0.32
0.13
0.11
0.03
0.32
0.31
0.35
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Table 3: Mean Weekly New Cases by Temperature and Tourism
Cooler
to
Warmer

Less tourism
22.56
10.47
5.71

to
54.25
39.36
27

More tourism
153.75
331.65
57.1

All
87.76
162.38
23.76

Table 4: Mean Weekly New Cases by Policy and Temperature
Pork
149.37
228.84
154.2
33.28

All
Cooler
to
Warmer

Vaccine
124.11
101.94
227.82
37.48

Flight
144.06
250.63
126.18
29.13

Thermo
128.81
292.44
193.96
32.95

Table 5: Mean Weekly New Cases by Population and Tourism
All
Less Tourism
to
More Tourism

Lowest Population
21.5
12.62
30.87
40.31

to
49.73
16.96
33.57
123.89

Highest Population
184.33
6.99
46.85
272.67

Table 6: Mean Weekly New Cases by Temperature and Population
All
Cooler
to
Warmer

Lowest Population
21.5
24.79
37.06
14.57

to
49.73
94.7
30.77
9.43

Highest Population
184.33
203.51
291.35
39.12
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Fig. 2: Pandemic Start Date by Continent and Development
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Fig. 3: Pandemic Start Date by Continent and Tourism
45.0

Week of Pandemic

40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
High Tourism
Africa

Asia

Median Tourism
Europe

North America

Low Tourism
South America

A-3

Fig. 4: Pandemic Start Date by Development and Tourism
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Fig. 5: Week of First H1N1 Case (World)
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Fig. 6: H1N1 Positive Countries by Pandemic Week
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Table 7: Interactions of Temperature and Tourism by Continent
(Temperature as Explanatory Variable)
Temperature

(1)
Asia
-175.9
(21.8)

(2)
Africa
176.1
(38.)

(3)
Europe
1020.2
(53.6)

(4)
North America
177.8
(45.5)

(5)
South America
109.8
(7.2)

Table 8: Effect of Development & Tourism on Week of First H1N1 Case
Least Tourism
to
Most Tourism

Medium Development
29.8
23.7
21.8

High Development
22.3
17.6
17.3

Very High Development
37
17.7
17

Table 9: Effect of Tourism and Temperature on Week of First H1N1 Case
Cooler
to
Warmer

Least Tourism
31.2
26.6
31.8

to
18.5
18.1
22.7

Most Tourism
17.5
19.7
17.5
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H1N1 Policies by Pandemic Week
40,000

By week 7, pork
and flight bans

35,000

By week 43,
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By week 12,
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Table 10: Poisson Estimates of Weekly New Cases (Robust SEs)
1 Week Lag New Cases

(1)
0.00
(0.00)

Time Controls

(2)
0.00
(0.00)
Yes

Geographic Controls

(3)
0.00
(0.00)
Yes

(4)
0.00
(0.00)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Country Controls
R2

Yes
0.45

0.51

0.53

0.60
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Fig. 7: Policy Selection by Human Development Index
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Fig. 8: Policy Selection by Region
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Table 11: Vaccine Distribution by Human Development
Very High
High
Medium

Mean Date
8-Nov-09
30-Dec-09
6-Jan-10

Lower Bound
4-Nov-09
26-Dec-09
1-Jan-10

Upper Bound
11-Nov-09
3-Jan-10
11-Jan-10

Table 12: OLS Estimates of the Effects of All Policies on Weekly New H1N1 Cases
(Robust Std. Errors)
Dependent variable is weekly new cases reported to the World Health Organization
Vaccination Began?
Thermoscanning Began?
Flight Ban Began?
Pork Ban Began?

(1)
29.11**
(12.4)
60.81*
(12.3)
68.67*
(14.9)
69.29*
(20.9)

1 Week Lagged New
Cases
Demographic Controls
(Population, GDP,
Tourism)
Geographic Controls
(Continent)
Influenza Propensity
Country Fixed Effects
Week Fixed Effects
R2
0.0149
Obs
6431
* Significant at the .01 level
** Significant at the .05 level

(2)
-9.88*
(3.8)
3.97
(4.4)
5.94
(6.0)
3.17
(8.2)

(3)
-15.61*
(4.5)
4.85
(4.7)
0.44
(6.2)
3.44
(6.5)

(4)
-14.75*
(4.6)
0.87
(5.5)
-1.12
(6.7)
0.26
(5.9)

(5)
-18.27*
(5.3)
7.11
(5.5)
3.42
(8.0)
0.18
(7.8)

(6)
-30.21*
(8.6)
12.01
(8.9)
23.45
(8.0)
18.29
(13.3)

(7)
-26.42*
(9.0)
2.40
(8.7)
13.43
(7.6)
11.68
(13.1)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.8801
6163

0.8796
5184

0.8801
5184

0.8823
5184

0.8795
6230

0.8800
6163
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Table 13: Poisson Estimates of the Effects of All Policies on Weekly New H1N1 Cases
(Robust Std. Errors)
Dependent variable is weekly new cases reported to the World Health Organization
(1)
0.29**
(.1)
0.60*
(.1)
0.58*
(.1)
0.55*
(.1)

Vaccination Began?
Thermoscanning Began?
Flight Ban Began?
Pork Ban Began?

1 Week Lagged New Cases
Demographic Controls (Population,
GDP, Tourism)

(2)
-0.3*
(.1)
0.58*
(.1)
0.44*
(.1)
0.5*
(.1)

(3)
-0.7*
(.1)
1.17*
(.1)
0.12
(.1)
0.17
(.2)

(4)
-0.67*
(.1)
1.15*
(.1)
0.14
(.1)
0.24
(.2)

(5)
-0.71*
(.1)
1.19*
(.1)
0.32**
(.1)
0.27**
(.1)

(6)
-0.96*
(.1)
1.02*
(.1)
0.12
(.1)
0.12
(.1)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

0.6021
6163

0.6015
5184

0.6530
5184

Geographic Controls (Continent)
Influenza Propensity
Week Fixed Effects
Pseudo R2
Obs
* Significant at the .01 level
** Significant at the .05 level

0.0631
6431

0.5058
6230

0.5935
6163

Table 14: Panel Poisson Estimates of the Effects of All Policies on Weekly New H1N1 Cases
Dependent variable is weekly new cases reported to the World Health Organization
Vaccination Began?
Thermoscanning Began?
Flight Ban Began?
Pork Ban Began?

(1)
-0.73*
(.0)
2.45*
(.0)
8.21*
(.6)
7.81*
(.8)

1 Week Lagged New Cases
Demographic Controls
(Population, GDP, Tourism)
Geographic Controls
(Continent)
Influenza Propensity
Week Fixed Effects

Log likelihood
Obs
* Significant at the .01 level

722989.48
6431

(2)
-0.8*
(.0)
2.1*
(.0)
7.86*
(.5)
7.34*
(.7)

(3)
-0.8*
(.0)
2.1*
(.0)
7.76*
(.5)
7.15*
(.7)

(4)
-0.8*
(.0)
2.1*
(.0)
7.68*
(.5)
7.09*
(.7)

(5)
-0.81*
(.0)
2.19*
(.0)
7.86*
(.6)
7.3*
(.8)

(6)
-1.2*
(.0)
1.62*
(.0)
6.94*
(.5)
6.08*
(.7)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

-423241.68
6163

-409159.06
5184

-345656.98
5184

-425504.04
6230

-423244.92
6163
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Table 15: Mean Weekly New Cases During & Post-Pandemic
All
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
South America
Very High Development
High Development
Medium Development
Low Tourism
Med Tourism
High Tourism
Low Temperature
Med Temperature
High Temperature
Low GDP
Med GDP
High GDP
Low Population
Med Population
High Population

Pandemic
108.55
(7.34)
25.06
(3.64)
135.19
(15.38)
65.27
(5.82)
321.98
(40.91)
108.55
(7.34)
164.65
(16.62)
101.42
(12.38)
66.75
(8.59)
16.1
(1.53)
46.54
(4.51)
246.19
(19.66)
103.82
(11.72)
191.33
(18.1)
28.49
(2.53)
77.67
(9.57)
78.65
(9.96)
171.07
(17.28)
23.65
(2.15)
60.69
(9.54)
220.41
(17.59)

Post-Pandemic
41.05
(4.07)
12.17
(3.41)
52.58
(10.5)
54.91
(7.19)
40.22
(11.71)
1.87
(.36)
63.82
(7.36)
33.86
(8.93)
27.71
(5.83)
6.76
(.72)
10.23
(1.21)
98.16
(10.71)
42.2
(5.68)
71.53
(10.96)
9.66
(1.85)
29.36
(6.31)
28.07
(7.07)
65.16
(7.58)
14.45
(1.6)
19.03
(3.97)
80.04
(9.79)

% Decline
-62%
-51%
-61%
-16%
-88%
-98%
-61%
-67%
-58%
-58%
-78%
-60%
-59%
-63%
-66%
-62%
-64%
-62%
-39%
-69%
-64%
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Honors Summary
The 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic was the basis for many fears,
precautions, and policies. This paper seeks to discover the key determinants of
each country’s pandemic experience—what factors influenced its arrival, its
sustenance, and its eventual dissipation. The H1N1 pandemic ended in August of
2010, but the virus still circulates in most of the world as part of the subtype A
seasonal influenza. Study of this influenza pandemic may help prepare the world
to take multilateral action against the next threat of outbreak.
I built my dataset of policy selections from news articles during the
pandemic, checking which of the four policies (vaccination, thermal scanning,
pork bans, and flight bans) were used in each of the 88 countries. My weekly
H1N1 case data come from the United Nations World Health Organization, and
includes weekly reports for 110 weeks, from the spring of 2009 to spring of 2011.
In constructing a model that would predict the weekly caseload of each
country I thought about how a pandemic functions. Each country must have a
point of contact that brings the virus to the country, as H1N1 influenza is
contagious, not environmental. I used international visitor arrival data to construct
a measure of tourism, and also included a variable for each continent to account
for the increased likelihood of travel between nearby countries.
But travel alone would probably not be enough to determine how long the
pandemic would last in a given country. A country’s population, level of
development, and a range of social factors would seem to determine the
likelihood of the disease to spread within its borders. I included population, gross
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domestic product, and seasonal flu infection rates for each country to account for
any baseline variation in susceptibility (like variations in personal space) or in
reporting (as seasonal flu cases are reported via the same mechanism). I also
included a one-week lag of weekly new cases to account for the contagious nature
of the disease—in the absence of travel, one must have old cases to cause new
ones. Finally, I adjusted for country-specific trends and week-specific trends by
using variables for fixed effects.
These factors gave me a model of predicted pandemic behavior. However,
these factors predicted that the pandemic would continue much longer than it did.
Adding the policy variables to the model, it appears that mass vaccination
campaigns had a significant effect in reducing the average weekly caseload, and
given the widespread adoption of this policy, it likely had an effect in speeding
the end of the pandemic. The policy variables are coded as “has it happened yet,”
meaning that the regression model looks at each country-week combination, and
compares it with the set of policy dates and countries. For a country that began
vaccinating during the 43rd week of the pandemic, all observations (weeks of data
from that country) from weeks 44 on will be coded as “yes” (in reality, “1”),
allowing the model to generate a coefficient for the effect on weekly cases of
being in a week in a country where vaccines have been distributed, compared to a
week in that country before the policy was implemented and to weeks in other
countries not implementing this policy.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression works by identifying the unique
effects of each variable on the regressor of interest, in this case, weekly new cases.
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For example, more populous nations may tend to have higher GDPs, causing
these two variables to affect new cases in a similar way. OLS kicks out the
shared effects, and creates a coefficient based on specifically having the attribute
of the variable. The coefficient is the expected change in weekly new cases based
on a one-unit change in the variable. As the policies are coded in a binary form,
their coefficients are the effects of having the policy in place.
A Poisson regression takes a slightly different approach. This model
assumes that the count presented in the dependent variable is a function of
independent vectors. My model uses three such vectors—one for a country’s
baseline characteristics, one for a given week’s expected impact (week fixed
effects), and one for the policies’ expected impact, based on country and on week.
The coefficient on a Poisson regression is interpreted as the natural log of the
change in weekly cases corresponding with a one-unit difference in the vector
predictor. As the policy variables are still coded in a binary form, their
coefficients are the effects of having the policy in place, rather than a gradientlike spectrum of effects.
I also used sample means from my data set to determine the effect of
various demographic and geographic factors on the arrival of the pandemic in a
given country. In general, warmer countries with the most tourism and the
highest level of development had the earliest start to the pandemic. However,
geographic factors also played a role. Countries in North and South America had
the earliest reporting of cases, while countries in Asia and Africa experienced a
much later start to the pandemic.
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Finally, I was curious about the effects of being in a “post-pandemic” period
compared with a pandemic period, and wanted to see if I could find representation
of what caused WHO to change its description. While panels C and D of figure 1
provides some insights into the stabilization of the situation, I wanted to
numerically compared the April 2009 to August 2010 period with the August
2010 to March 2011 period.
These results are presented in table 15. I found that most subgroups (by
climate, demographic, and geographic controls) experienced roughly a 60%
decline in weekly new cases of H1N1 (Table 15). However, countries in Europe
experienced a much more shallow decline in weekly cases, dropping 16% (from
65 cases/week to 55 cases/week). Countries in North and South America
experienced a more dramatic decline, with countries in North America dropping
88% (from 322 cases/week to 40 cases/week) and countries in South America
dropping 98% (from 109 cases/week to 2 cases/week).
This may be due to the different start dates among the three continents—
North and South America’s pandemic may have been nearing an end earlier in
2010 while Europe’s later start date may have pushed the height of the pandemic
later. However, further research into the “life cycle” of pandemics is required to
fully understand these and the policy effects.
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